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COST CONTAINMENT AND THE PHYSICIAN'S
FIDUCIARY DUTY TO THE PATIENT
Thomas H. Boyd*
In whatever kind of organizational setting physicians practice these days,
they must above all be more vigilant than ever to ensure that patients'
interests are protected. If patients ever lose their trust in the commitment
of the medical profession, they and their physicians will be deprived of
an element vital to good care, and the quality of medical services will
decline. Physicians have an obligation to preserve their patients' trust. It
is an obligation quite different from, and often incompatible with, the
relations between sellers and buyers in a commercial market. That is why
what is good, i.e., profitable, for the new health care businesses may not
be so good for ethical physicians or for the patients they are sworn to
serve.
INTRODUCTION
During the 1970's and early 1980's, both public and private sector health
insurance programs were structured in such a way as to encourage extrava-
gance and waste.2 Payments were made on the basis of services actually
rendered.3 Thus, there was great incentive for wasteful duplication and
overutilization of services and facilities.' This retrospective cost reimburse-
ment system5 has of course permitted health care providers to receive higher
profits. It has also bestowed upon physicians the ability to shield themselves
from liability through the practice of "defensive medicine."
6
* Associate, Winthrop & Weinstine, St. Paul, Minnesota. B.A., 1984, M.A., 1987,
University of Iowa; J.D., 1987, University of Iowa College of Law. Member of the Illinois,
Iowa, Minnesota, and Missouri bars. The author wishes to express appreciation to Elizabeth
Boyd, Louis Rodgers, and Wayne Wilson for sharing with him their insightful thoughts on this
topic.
1. Relman, Practicing Medicine in the New Business Climate, 316 NEW ENO. J. MED.
1150, 1151 (1987).
2. Miller, Cost Containment: Criteria for Physician Standard of Care and Need for
Documentation of Expert Witness Experience, 35 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 1, 1 (1988); Carlucci,
Health Care Systems: D.R.G. 's and Medical Malpractice, 58 N.Y. ST. B.J. 14, 15 (1986).
3. Cline & Rosten, The Effect of Policy Language on the Containment of Health Care
Cost, 21 TORT & INs. L.J. 120, 122 (1985).
4. Entin, DRG's, HMO's and PPO's: Introducing Economic Issues in the Medical Mal-
practice Case, 20 FORUM 674, 675 (1984-1985).
5. Note, Medicare "Cost Containment" and Home Health Care: Potential Liability for
Physicians and Hospitals, 21 GA. L. REV. 901, 901 (1988); Carlucci, supra note 2, at 15.
6. The term "defensive medicine" refers to a practice in which physicians utilize exhaustive
diagnostic and treatment methods of minimum value to ensure the best quality of health care
while at the same time erecting an undefeatable defense against liability. Shavell, Theoretical
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Facing a crisis in the area of health care costs,7 however, Congress enacted
a prospective payment system in 1986.8 As a consequence, payments made
under Medicare are now based on predetermined rates which correspond
with one of 470 diagnosis related groups. 9 The prospective payment system
generates incentive to reduce costs so as to keep them at or below the given
rate. 10 This, in turn, has led to a reduction in services provided to the
Issues in Medical Malpractice, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 35, 49 (S. Rotten-
berg ed. 1978). See also Macaulay, Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice:
On a Collision Course, 21 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 91, 91 (1986) (fear of lawsuits prompt physicians
to waste resources by ordering unnecessary tests and treatments); Grad, Medical Malpractice
and the Crisis of Insurance Availability: The Waning Options, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1058,
1060-61 (1986) (physicians practice defensive medicine to establish a "litigation proof chart").
See generally Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971
DUKE L.J. 939 (threat of malpractice litigation creates incentive to practice defensive medicine
which, in turn, raises the cost of medical care overall).
7. Carlucci, supra note 2, at 15; Entin, supra note 4, at 676; Macaulay, supra note 6, at
91; Miller, supra note 2, at 2. "In 1977, health care expenditures were $170 billion and
represented 9 percent of the gross national product. At the beginning of 1987, health care
expenditures had risen to $458 billion, or 10.9 percent of the gross national product." Greenberg,
Introduction, Special Issue on Competition in the Health Care Sector: Ten Years Later, 13 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 223, 223 (1988). See generally Wing, American Health Policy in the
1980's, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 608 (1986). One commentator aptly stated the problem as
follows:
Both as individuals and as makers of public policy, our individual and collective
wants clearly exceed our resources. This is particularly true in medicine, where
medical technology has outpaced the ability of the public to pay. In medicine the
infinite needs of the public have collided with our society's finite resources. Com-
mentators have aptly observed that the divergence between what is good for the
patient and what is efficient for society is crucial to current concerns over health
care spending. No set of expenditures can rise faster than the Gross National
Product forever. The U.S. cannot maintain its present rate of growth in health care
spending while simultaneously investing to restore productivity, growth, and inter-
national competitiveness.
Lamm, Misallocating Health Care and Societal Resources, 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 241, 241-42 (1988).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1986).
9. Carlucci, supra note 2, at 15. As Carlucci explains,
Diagnosis Related Groups [D.R.G.] is a reimbursement system developed by re-
searchers at the Yale University School of Organization and Management in the
early 1970's. The system is premised on the identification of various patient diag-
noses. There are a total of eighty-three major diagnoses categories where illnesses
are grouped together as they relate to pathology or clinical management of the
illness. To deal with a wide variation in the cost of treating illness within the major
categories, the D.R.G. is further broken down by a variety of factors such as age,
secondary diagnosis and surgical procedures. . . . The entire system is premised on
the concept that a patient who is classified into a given D.R.G. should cost the
same as all other patients within that D.R.G. as the care requirements will be the
same.
Id.
10. Roper, Balancing Efficiency and Quality-Toward Market-Based Health Care, 3 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 169, 172 (1988); Entin, supra note 4, at 676.
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patient." Private health care insurance programs have followed the govern-
ment's lead in adopting prospective payment as the primary compensation
scheme. 12
Our society is in the process of making a total commitment to provide
adequate and affordable health care to all of our citizens.' 3 The method by
which such an objective can be achieved is through the cost containment
strategies which have evolved in the prospective payment period.' 4 Conse-
quently, the proliferation of Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMO's"), 5
Preferred Provider Organizations ("PPO's") 6 and similar forms of third-
party payor programs, which emphasize cost containment through managed
11. Cline & Rosten, supra note 3, at 122.
12. Entin, supra note 4, at 680-82. Indeed, the federal government has actively encouraged
the private sector to develop payment plans that use a similar prospective payment approach.
Schuck, Malpractice Liability and the Rationing of Care, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1421, 1421-23 (1981).
13. Callahan, Meeting Needs and Rationing Care, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 261, 261
(1988); Comment, Cost v. Quality in the Regulation of Preferred Provider Arrangements: A
"Green Light to the Gold Rush"? 41 Sw. L.J. 1155, 1155 (1988).
The President's Commission concluded that the correct standard for judging the
fairness of health care distribution is one that ensures everyone equitable access to
care, defined as access to "an adequate level of health care." The commission
concluded that equitable access to care requires that people not face "excessive
burdens" in obtaining care-such as out-of-pocket expenses, travel and waiting
time, and the like. Adequate care is "enough care to achieve sufficient welfare,
opportunity, information, and evidence of interpersonal concern to facilitate a
reasonably full and satisfying life."
Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical and Legal Implications of Changes in the
Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 708, 743-44 (1986) (citing 1 PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 20-22 (1983)). See also Harris, Gatekeepers and
Cost-Containers in HMO's, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1698, 1698 (1988) ("Government, business,
and our own patients are telling us to change the delivery of medical care to include all our
citizens.").
14. See generally Wing, supra note 7.
15. An HMO can be defined as:
a single entity providing comprehensive health care services for a prepaid fee. An
HMO, as both a health insurer and a health care provider, contracts with enrolled
subscribers to provide a range of health services. Generally, an HMO will provide,
at a minimum, physician, laboratory, x-ray, inpatient and outpatient hospital
services, and emergency care. Supplemental services, such as dental care, are often
included in the plan.
Note, Health Maintenance Organizations and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 7 AM. J.L. & MED.
437, 437 (1982). An HMO may own the facility, provide most of the services, and employ the
care providers or it could contract with Individual Practice Associations or Networks where
providers collectively contract with HMOs to provide services to subscribers at the physicians'
own offices. Id.
16. "The private sector increasingly uses preferred provider networks ("PPO's") to direct
beneficiaries to selected providers. Plan administrators enroll providers that offer high quality
care at favorable prices. Provider performance is assessed through utilization review, and poor
performers are excluded from the network." Roper, supra note 10, at 178.
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health care,' 7 has been encouraged." The rationale is that the greater the
involvement of the private sector, the lighter the burden which must be
borne by the government.' 9
This revolutionary shift from retrospective cost reimbursement to a pro-
spective payment system has resulted in a serious conflict of interest for
physicians. 21 On the one hand, a doctor has the responsibility of providing
adequate care to his or her patients. 2' On the other hand, a physician is
subject to tremendous pressure to minimize the expense of that care. 22 The
difficulty of this situation is intensified by the fact that the standard of care
by which physicians are evaluated is based on practices and case law devel-
oped during the period of retrospective reimbursement and defensive medi-
cine.
23
Many commentators view the change from retrospective reimbursement to
a prospective payment system as a repudiation of society's objective to
provide adequate care to all subscribers. 24 As a result, they have forwarded
an array of radical proposals that would fundamentally alter the state of
the law and the standard of professionalism in medicine.25 The purpose of
this article is to evaluate these various proposals in light of society's expressed
objectives and the state of modern case law. Part I reviews the legal status
of the physician-patient relationship.2 6 Part II examines provisions in agree-
17. Frech & Ginsburg, Competition Among Health Insurers, Revisited, 13 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 279, 282-83 (1988).
18. Capron, supra note 13, at 712.
19. Ginzberg, A Hard Look at Cost Containment, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1151, 1152-53
(1987); Rosenblatt, Medicaid Primary Care Case Management, the Doctor-Patient Relationship,
and the Politics of Privatization, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 915, 965 (1986). It must be noted,
however, that several factors may nonetheless necessitate significant government involvement.
These factors include the growth of the uninsured population, resistance to double payment,
concern about quality, concern about the physician-patient relationship, financial difficulties of
large health care corporations, and fears of employees in health care. Fuchs, The Counterrev-
olution in Health Care Financing, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1154, 1155-56 (1987).
20. Furrow, The Ethics of Cost-Containment: Bureaucratic Medicine and the Doctor as
Patient-Advocate, 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 187, 189-95 (1988); McCormick,
The Cost-Factor in Health Care, 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 161, 161 (1988);
Relman, Practicing Medicine in the New Business Climate, 316 NEw ENG. J. MaD. 1150, 1150
(1987).
21. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'y 23, 44 (1986); Marsh, Health Care Cost Containment and the Duty to
Treat, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 158-60 (1985).
22. Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1004, 1013-15 (1985). For example, staff privileges may be directly or indirectly tied
to the level of utilization. See also Knapp v. Palos Community Hosp., 125 Ill. App. 3d 244,
257, 465 N.E.2d 554, 564-65 (1st Dist. 1984) (physician's staff privileges revoked for overutil-
ization).
23. Note, supra note 22, at 1008-13.
24. Furrow, Medical Malpractice and Cost Containment: Tightening the Screws, 36 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 985, 993 (1986).
25. See infra notes 97-138 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 31-71 and accompanying text.
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ments made in the private sector" between third-party payors and physicians
which may affect the physician-patient relationship. 28 Part III evaluates a
number of the proposals which assume that the objective of providing health
care for all Americans necessitates the sacrifice of quality care, and in light
of this assumption have been offered as ways to help physicians cope with
this dilemma. 29 Finally, Part IV proposes an additional and preferable so-
lution based on the doctrine of fiduciary duty which currently applies to
physicians.30
I. THE PHYSICIAN'S STANDARD OF CARE
No authority may seriously dispute that physicians owe a fiduciary duty31
to their patients.12 Essentially, this means that a physician must place the
27. For critical assessments of governmental insurance plans, see Sharkey & Buckle, The
Medicare Prospective Payment System: Impact on the Frail Elderly and an Alternative Reim-'
bursement Formula, 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 227 (1988); Mehlmann, Health
Care Cost Containment and Medical Technology: A Critique of Waste Theory, 36 CASE W.
REs. L. REV. 778 (1986); Note, supra note 5.
28. See infra notes 72-96 and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 97-138 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 139-67 and accompanying text.
31. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 comment b (1959); H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 235 (3d ed. 1983). The Honorable Benjamin Cardozo
wrote the classic description of fiduciary duty:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there
has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity
has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions .... Only
thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd.
G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1, at 3 (2d ed. 1984) (quoting Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 459, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928)).
32. 10 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1286A, at 947 & n.3 (3d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1988). The
Supreme Court of North Carolina has fairly described this duty:
The relationship of patient and physician is generally considered a fiduciary one,
imposing upon the physician the duty of good faith and fair dealing. This special
relationship envisions an expectation by both parties that the patient will rely upon
the judgment and expertise of the doctor. Furthermore, this relation is predicated
on the fundamental proposition that the physician possesses special knowledge or
skill in diagnosing and treating diseases and injuries, which the patient lacks, and
that the patient has sought and obtained the services of the physician because of
such special knowledge and skill.
Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 646, 325 S.E.2d 469, 482 (1985) (citations omitted). See
Yates v. EI-Deiry, 160 Ill. App. 3d 198, 202, 513 N.E.2d 519, 522 (3d Dist. 1987) (physician's
fiduciary duty flows from unique role in society); Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 111.
App. 3d 581, 587, 499 N.E.2d 952, 957 (lst Dist. 1986) (public policy strongly favors fiduciary
nature of physician-patient relationship); Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Ky. 1952)
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interests and well-being of the patient above his or her own interest. 3 This
is not to say that physicians must provide their services gratis. Rather, they
are entitled to reasonable compensation for services rendered.14 Once a
(relationship resembles that of mother and son); Melynchenko v. Clay, 152 Mich. App. 193,
197, 393 N.W.2d 589, 591 (1986) (physician's fiduciary duty requires confidence, trust, and
good faith); Hoopes v. Hammargren, 102 Nev. 425, 431, 725 P.2d 238, 242 (1986) (utmost
good faith is required because society has placed physicians in elevated position of trust as a
fiduciary); Cates v. Wilson, 83 N.C. App. 448, 458, 350 S.E.2d 898, 905 (1986) (physician's
fiduciary duty involves trust and confidence and requires the exercise of utmost good faith);
Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 395, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1052 (1984) (physician's
fiduciary duty requires good faith and fair dealing); Omer v. Edgren, 38 Wash. App. 376, 378,
685 P.2d 635, 636-37 (1984) (fiduciary duty of physician to patient analogous to guardian-ward
relationship and requires exercise of scrupulous good faith on physician's part). See also Harrison
v. United States, 708 F.2d 1023, 1028 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983) (concealing information from patient
violates fiduciary relationship); Sheets v. Burman, 322 F.2d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 1963) (physician's
concealment that he left surgical needle in patient violated duty to disclose); Nutty v. Jewish
Hosp., 571 F. Supp. 1050, 1052 (S.D. Ill. 1983) (physician's duty to patient does not extend
to include all hospital staff. Only those in less than arms-length relationship with patient have
fiduciary duty); Miles v. Danner, 549 F. Supp. 82, 84 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (physician owes fiduciary
duty to protect confidential information and should not discuss patient's condition with opposing
counsel, except as allowed under rules of civil procedure); Taylor v. Wilmington Medical Center,
Inc., 538 F. Supp. 339, 343 (D. Del. 1982) (physician has duty not to conceal facts from
patients); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio 1964)
(physician has fiduciary duty not to reveal confidential information about client). See generally
Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMO's and Customary Practice, 1975
DUKE L.J. 1375, 1395-96 (1976) (physicians owe fiduciary duty to their patients, not to the
insurers or the government agencies who pay the bills); Curran & Moseley, The Malpractice
Experience of Health Maintenance Organizations, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 69, 75-77 (1975) (fiduciary
relationship that exists between physician and patient, should also exist between HMO and
subscriber); Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CALIF. L. REv.
1719, 1727 (1987) (allowing physician to balance their patient's interests against third-party
interests would devastate the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient); Stern, Bad
Faith Suits: Are They Applicable to Health Maintenance Organizations? 85 W. VA. L. REV.
911, 919 (1983) (HMO's should afford the interests of their subscribers at least as much
consideration as they give their own interests).
33. American Medical Association, Current Opinions of the Judicial Council: Principles of
Medical Ethics 2.03, 2.08 (1984).
34. Physician compensation has long been held to be a matter of basic contract law. Where
the physician has made an express contract to provide the patient with care at a certain fee,
the right to compensation is limited to the amount stated in the agreement. See, e.g., Shields
Constr. Co. v. Cowan, 270 Ky. 173, 178-79, 109 S.W.2d 585, 588 (1937) (mutual promises by
physician and injured worker's employer create contract). In the absence of an express agree-
ment, the law will imply a right to compensation in the amount of the reasonable value of the
services rendered and the expenses incurred in providing those services. See Citron v. Fields,
30 Cal. App. 2d 51, 57, 85 P.2d 534, 537-38 (1938) (court may question physician and look at
patient's ability to pay to set fee); In re McKeehan's Estate, 358 Pa. 548, 552-53, 57 A.2d 907,
909 (1948) (value of services may be set by court). It must be kept in mind, however, that a
physician always has the right to refuse to enter into any physician-patient relationship, See
Findlay v. Board of Supervisors of Mohave, 72 Ariz. 58, 65, 230 P.2d 526, 531 (1951) (h6spital
may exclude physicians from their staff); Rice v. Rinaldo, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 183, 185, 119
N.E.2d 657, 659 (1951) (physician's office is not a place of public accommodation for those
prohibited from racial discrimination).
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physician assumes the care of a patient, however, any conflict between the
physician's and the patient's interests must be resolved in favor of the
patient."
Generally, a physician's fiduciary duty is considered to attach at the time
the physician undertakes to treat the patient.3 6 From that point, through the
duration of the treatment of and consultation with the patient, the physician
is bound to fully disclose his or her findings to the patient,37 to ensure the
confidentiality of the relationship,3 8 and, most significantly, to provide a
level of care that meets accepted standards in the profession. 9
35. A. JONSEN, M. SIEGLER & W. WINSLADE, CLINICAL ETHICS §§ 4.2.4, 4.4.3 (2d ed. 1986).
"[I]n the Hippocratic tradition, the actions of medical practitioners are supposed to promote
the interests of patients above all others, including the physicians." Capron, supra note 13, at
710. See also R. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 22 (1981) (the Hippocratic Oath
encompasses a fundamental moral principle-do good or at least do no harm to your patient).
Indeed, "physicians are ethically bound to place the medical needs of their patients above their
own financial interests." Relman, Dealing With Conflicts of Interest, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED.
749, 750 (1985).
36. R. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 227-29 (4th ed. 1983). The creation of the
relationship must be an intentional act on the part of the physician. For example, the mere
presence of a physician who is monitoring the conduct of another physician so as to evaluate
the latter physician's qualifications has not entered into a fiduciary relationship with the patient
and does not have the duty to intervene if he or she witnesses malpractice. Clarke v. Hoek,
174 Cal. App. 3d 208, 215-16, 219 Cal. Rptr. 845, 850-51 (1985).
37. See Lambert v. Park, 597 F.2d 236, 239 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1979) (ensuring informed
consent is in the nature of "fiduciary duty" of physician); Nardone v. Reynolds, 538 F.2d
1131, 1136 (5th Cir. 1976) (physicians' duty to disclose stems from fiduciary duty); Ostojic v.
Brueckmann, 405 F.2d 302, 304 (7th Cir. 1968) (existence of physician's fiduciary duty requires
full disclosure); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 207 (E.D. La. 1980) (fiduciary duty
entails full disclosure and informed consent). The fiduciary duty may create a presumption of
fraud where there has been nondisclosure. See Smith v. Cook County Hosp., 164 II1. App. 3d
857, 865, 518 N.E.2d 336, 341 (1st Dist. 1987) (Illinois courts have not applied a fiduciary
relationship exception to the requirement that a fraud action be brought within a reasonable
time after discovery); Walters v. Rinker, 520 N.E.2d 468, 470-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (physician
did not actually deceive patient because he did not know he misdiagnosed the patient).
38. See Manion v. N.P.W. Medical Center of N.E. Pa., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585, 588 (M.D.
Pa. 1987) (duty to ensure confidentiality of relationship); Alston v. Greater Southeast Com-
munity Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35, 37 (D.D.C. 1985) (fiduciary duty requires confidentiality). See
also Jordan v. Sinai Hosp. of Detroit, Inc., 171 Mich. App. 328, 344, 429 N.W.2d 891, 899
(1988) (because of physician's fiduciary duty to patient he should not hold ex parte conferences
with opposing party); Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 13-14, 361 S.E.2d 734, 742 (1987) (com-
munication between physician and patient protected by state privilege statute unless patient
waives privilege); Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 677, 756 P.2d 138, 141 (1988) (physicians
should not participate in ex parte conferences because it chills relationship with patients).
39. See Manion v. N.P.W. Medical Center of N.E. Pa., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585, 588 (M.D.
Pa. 1987) (Pennsylvania requires reasonable notice before defendant's counsel may interview
ex parte plaintiff's physician); Hoopes v. Hammargren, 102 Nev. 425, 431, 725 P.2d 238, 242
(1986) (physician's sexual relations with patient could violate duty of utmost good faith); Watts
v. Cumberland Hosp. System, Inc., 75 N.C. App. 1, 16, 330 S.E.2d 242, 250 (1985) (physician
should not disclose confidential information about patient); Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13
Ohio App. 3d 393, 395, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1052 (1984) (obligations include duty to exercise due
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At one time, the standard of care to which a physician was held varied
from one locality to another due to the significant discrepancy of resources
and equipment, and the general availability of competent physicians. 40 The
standard for evaluating care has since evolved toward a singular national or
profession-wide standard. 4' Rather than making allowances for inequities of
location, the medical profession and the courts expect physicians to make
decisions that are in the best interests of the patient, 42 including making
referrals to more competent specialists who have the advantage of better
equipped facilities. 43 Today, barring an emergency situation,4 a physician
care and skill as well as to inform patient and obtain informed consent); McCarroll v. Reed,
679 P.2d 851, 854 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983) (physician had duty to use skill, care and diligence
to prevent drug addiction of patients).
40. See generally 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.1, at 554-
58 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter F. HARPER]; W. KEETON, D. DoBas, R. KEETON & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 32, at 187-88 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
41. 1 S. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 2:5 (1980
& Supp. 1988). See generally Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 408 (1969); Entin, supra note 4. See, e.g., Hyles
v. Cockrill, 169 Ga. App. 132, 138, 312 S.E.2d 124, 131 (1983) (court must include standard
injury instructions); Zeller v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 67 Md. App. 75, 86, 506 A.2d
646, 652 (1986) (giving postcoital drug to rape victim was not contrary to nationwide standard
because no standard existed); Paintiff v. Parkersburg, 345 S.E.2d 564, 565 (W.Va. 1986) (no
social policy is served by limiting standard of care to locality).
42. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. See generally Callahan, Competency in
Medical Care, 63 NEB. L. REV. 663 (1984) (physician must be more than technically competent,
he or she must also be sensitive to the moral aspects of health care); Furrow, Malpractice
Revisited: Of Medical Errors, Social Transformation, and Tort Standards, 63 NEB. L. REV.
810 (1984) (malpractice litigation provides an incentive for physicians to act in their client's
best interests); Janulis & Hornstein, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: Hospitals'
Liability for Physicians' Malpractice, 64 NEB. L. REV. 689 (1985) (hospital liability is expanding
because law presumes that the average person is not medically sophisticated and as such, places
their trust in the physician and hospital); Shapiro, Medical Malpractice: History, Diagnosis and
Prognosis, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 469 (1978) (physician is held to standard of care which is
defined by the medical profession, regardless of locality).
43. Taylor v. Wilmington Med. Center, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 309, 317 (D. Del. 1983) (physician
has duty to refer patient to specialist if other neurosurgeons in similar situations would do so);
Dewes v. Indian Health Serv., 504 F. Supp. 203, 208 (D.S.D. 1980) (physician has duty to
consult specialist if he lacks requisite skill for patient's condition); Lewis v. Soriano, 374 So.
2d .829, 831 (Miss. 1979) (general practitioner should have referred patient to orthopedic surgeon
for complicated fracture). See generally Stevens, Malpractice Liability of a Referring Physician,
32 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 121 (1986) ("The general rule is that a physician who calls in or
recommends another physician or surgeon is not liable for the other's malpractice, at least
where there was no agency or concert of action, or no negligence in the selection of the other
physician or surgeon." (citing Stoval v. Harms, 214 Kan. 835, 840, 522 P.2d 353, 357 (1974))).
44. Finley, Goodwin & Fisher, Tort Reform and Medical Malpractice: Iowa's Past, Present,
and Future, 36 DRAKE L. REV. 669, 674 (1987). See generally Note, Good Samaritans and
Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1964) (good samaritan statutes
were created to shield physicians from liability in emergency situations where their expertise
may be in some other area); Note, Good Samaritan Legislation: An Analysis and a Proposal,
38 TEMP. L.Q. 418 (1965) (many of these statutes require "good faith" and "no compensation"
prerequisites).
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has a duty to refrain from providing health care except where he or she is
able to provide that care at an acceptable level. 5
In addition to the duty owed by a physician during treatment, there also
are decisions made by the physician prior to the commencement of treatment
which can be retroactively subjected to the strict scrutiny of the fiduciary
standard. Such decisions may include securing the assistance of a competent
support staff, 46 designing and maintaining an adequate recordkeeping sys-
tem, 47 participating in available continuing education programs to ensure an
understanding of the state of the art diagnostic and treatment methods,
48
attaining privileges with high quality health care facilities, 49 and making
provisions which ensure the financial ability to meet any potential liability
which may arise from the practice. 0 All of these decisions involve the
common concern that physicians must strive to minimize any potential
interference with their ability to treat patients once the physician-patient
relationship has been established. There are certain situations where a phy-
sician may take into account the patient's economic interests in making
treatment decisions. 5' However, taking a patient's economic interest into
account will constitute a breach of the physician's fiduciary duty if he or
she has unreasonably permitted a third party to compromise the physician-
patient relationship. 2
45. R. CRAWFORD & A. MORITZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 135 (5th ed. 1971);
S. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN, supra note 41, at § 2:5.
46. See, e.g., Voss v. Bridwell, 188 Kan. 643, 655-56, 364 P.2d 955, 966 (1961) (physician
may be liable for negligence of assistants by principles of law, agency or master and servant);
Boyle v. Breme, 93 N.J. 569, 573, 461 A.2d 1164, 1167 n.4 (1983) (standard of care owed by
other staff members may differ from physician's duty). See also Morris, The Negligent Nurse-
The Physician and the Hospital, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 109 (1981) (hospital and/or physician may
be responsible for negligent medical care of nurses).
47. This responsibility is closely tied to the physician's duty to keep patient records confi-
dential and the duty to provide proper care in tight- of the information that has been gathered
on the individual patient's condition. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying notes.
48. In addition, the duty to keep abreast of new developments in medicine is crucial in view
of the evolution of the national standard of care. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying
text.
49. See Furrow, supra note 24, at 1030.
50. See Backlund v. Board of Comm'n of Kings County Hosp., 106 Wash. 2d 632, 648,
724 P.2d 981, 990 (1986) (hospital board revoked physician's privileges because he failed to
purchase medical malpractice insurance). See also Kelly v. St. Vincent Hosp., 102 N.M. 201,
205, 692 P.2d 1350, 1354 (1984) (court upheld mandatory malpractice insurance policy).
51. "A doctor is not ethically required to pay for hospitalization or drugs that a patient
cannot afford, nor to be insensitive to a patient's desire to avoid crushing debts far beyond
his or her ability to pay." Rosenblatt, supra note 19, at 926 n.43. See also Furrow, supra note
20, at 205.
52. See Swayze v. McNeil Labs, Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1987) (physicians have a
duty to protect patients against undue exercise of third-party discretion in treatment of patients).
See also Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 99-100 (physician has duty
to treat patient-should not allow insurance company to interfere), reh'g, 243 F. Supp. 793,
799 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (physicians have duty to provide patients with undivided loyalty and
protection against third-party interference with physician-patient relationship).
19891
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
A recent and much celebrated case, Wickline v. State,53 dramatized the
difficult circumstances that physicians now face as they try to reconcile the
conflict between adequate care and cost containment. 4 In Wickline, a patient
brought an action against Medi-Cal, California's medical assistance pro-
gram." The patient had been hospitalized for arteriosclerosis and conse-
quential circulatory complications in her right leg.16 Her treating physician
believed that she should remain in the hospital for continued treatment and
monitoring of her condition.17 Consultants who reviewed the case on behalf
of Medi-Cal, however, determined that she should be discharged. 8 Soon
after the patient left the hospital, she experienced problems arising from a
blood clot in her right leg.5 9 The seriousness of her condition eventually
required the amputation of that leg.
60
In the ensuing lawsuit against Medi-Cal, the patient successfully alleged
that the amputation was the result of premature discharge from the hospital. 61
She had not named the treating physician as a defendant, 62 so the jury
verdict was solely against Medi-Cal. 63 This verdict, however, was reversed
on appeal. 64 In making its ruling, the California Court of Appeals stated:
Third party payors of health care services can be held legally accountable
when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design
or implementation of cost containment mechanisms as, for example, when
appeals made on a patient's behalf for medical or hospital care are
arbitrarily ignored or unreasonably disregarded or overridden. However,
the physician who complies without protest with the limitations imposed
by a third party payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise,
cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for the patient's care. He cannot
point to the health care payor as the liability scapegoat when the conse-
quences of his own determinative medical decisions go sour.61
In other words, the pressures and constraints of a prospective evaluation of
medical care costs will not be taken into account when assessing a physician's
liability. The treating physician retains "ultimate responsibility" for the care
of the patient.
66
53. 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986).
54. Pellegrino, supra note 21, at 24-26.
55. Wickline, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1633, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
56. Id. at 1634, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 663-64.
57. Id. at 1636, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
58. Id. at 1638, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
59. Id. at 1640, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
60. Id. at 1641, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
61. Id. at 1633, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1647, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
65. Id. at 1645, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670-71 (emphasis added).
66. The California Court of Appeals stated that it:
appreciates what is at issue here is the effect of cost containment programs upon
the professional judgment of physicians to prescribe hospital treatment for patients
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Courts have similarly refused to accept compliance with a payor's guide-
lines as a satisfactory substitute for the physician's legal standard of care.
67
Moreover, jurors, sitting on medical malpractice cases, will be unsympathetic
towards physicians who have discharged a patient prematurely, 6s or who
have misdiagnosed a patient's condition due to a concern for keeping costs
down.6 9 These circumstances will instead be viewed as the result of irrespon-
sible conduct by a physician who subordinates the practice of responsible
medicine to the objective of maximizing profits. 70 Furthermore, as Wickline
reflects, there is a reluctance to hold third-party payors liable for fear of
discouraging private sector involvement in the area of low cost health care. 7'
In essence, the great pressures placed on physicians to minimize costs will
not serve as an adequate excuse to avoid liability for inadequate or improper
medical care.
1I. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
As Wickline demonstrates, physicians must carefully examine the terms
and conditions of the agreements which they enter into with health insurers.
72
The language of these contracts may severely narrow the physician's discre-
tion in the care of a patient. For example, the constructive result of such
contracts may be to allow nonattending physicians and health plan or hospital
administrators to make, or at least greatly influence, treatment decisions
while leaving the attending physician completely exposed to liability for those
requiring the same. While we recognize, realistically, that cost consciousness has
become a permanent feature of the health care system, it is essential that cost
limitation programs not be permitted to corrupt medical judgment.
Id. at 1647, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
67. Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 134 (N.D.
Ill. 1975) (guidelines set out for federal compensation of physicians do not decrease duty owed
to patients who qualify for federal payment of medical expenses); Porubiansky v. Emory Univ.,
156 Ga. App. 602, 610, 275 S.E.2d 163, 169 (1980) (clinic may not require exculpatory clause
simply because it is an educational clinic), aff'd, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903, (1981); Olson
v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tenn. 1977) (exculpatory contract required by physician to
perform abortion is void as against public policy). See also Marcotte, Cost v. Quality, 74
A.B.A.J. 26, 26 (June 1988) ("cost constraints should not get a physician off the hook for
patient injury or sloppy utilization review"). On the contrary, courts allow physicians' "clinical
judgment to trump cost-oriented" judgments by third-party payors on treatment related issues.
Furrow, supra note 20, at 215.
68. Note, supra note 22, at 1010.
69. Entin, supra note 4, at 678.
70. Macaulay, supra note 6, at 108; Pellegrino, supra note 21, at 42-44.
71. Schuck, supra note 12, at 1426-27.
72. There are various types of these agreements and there is some debate as to which best
serves the market. See Rosenblatt, Health Care, Markets, and Democratic Values, 34 VAND.
L. REV. 1067, 1073-88 (1981) (impact on competition from these agreements can be classified
into three models: individual, entrepreneurial and organizational). See also Marmor, Boyer &
Greenberg, Medical Care and Procompetitive Reform, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1003 (1981) (proposes
fourth model: procompetitive approach).
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decisions.73 Physicians who fail to remain vigilant during contract negotia-
tions, and who permit the terms of these agreements74 to interfere with their
ability to provide the proper quality of care, are in breach of their fiduciary
duty to their patients.
A. Hold Harmless Provisions
The "hold harmless" provisions contained in many contracts between
health insurers and physicians provide that the attending physician should
be wholly responsible for the quality of the health care that subscribers are
to receive. If the care provided is substandard, this provision requires the
physician to hold harmless, indemnify, and defend the insurer. The language
of these provisions shifts all contractual liability to the physician, regardless
of the effect any constraints or pressures imposed by the third-party payor
may have on the delivery of care." A "hold harmless" provision may have
a positive influence in that it provides physicians with significant incentive
to maintain quality care. At the same time, however, it excuses, if not
encourages, third-party interference with the physician-patient relationship
by guaranteeing indemnity of such third-parties. Consequently, it places the
patient's welfare in danger and, in turn, results in a breach of the physician's
fiduciary duty.
73. Comment, Wickline v. State: The Emerging Liability of Third Party Health Care Payors,
24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1023, 1025 (1987). See also Capron, supra note 13, at 752-53 ("By
shifting the incentives and creating the disincentive that results from having one's own finances
at risk, the new method of physician reimbursement turns physicians into gatekeepers for the
health care system."); Rosenblatt, supra note 19, at 961 (physician's views on how to promote
patient care varies with their differences in reimbursement).
74. See infra notes 75-96 and accompanying text.
75. R. ROBINSON, REVISED PHYSICIAN'S CONTRACTING HANDBOOK 3 (rev. ed. 1985) [herein-
after CMA CONTRACTING HANDBOOK]. An indemnification clause may take the following form:
The physician shall be responsible for the quality of care rendered to the participants,
and agrees to hold harmless, indemnify, and defend the Health Insurance Organi-
zation, its employees, officers, and directors from any and all liability, including
reasonable attorney's fees, interests, and costs, arising out of or related to health
care provided by the physician under this contract.
Rodgers, Boyd, Boyd & Wilson, The HMO Contract and Quality of Care, 78 IOWA MED. 466,
467 (1988) [hereinafter Rodgers]. This type of hold harmless provision would not have been a
serious concern ten or perhaps even five years ago. At that time, physicians enjoyed virtually
complete autonomy in making diagnosis and treatment decisions. See supra notes 2-6 and
accompanying text. Subsequent contractual arrangements have imposed prior authorization
restrictions, utilization limitations, and cost containment regulations. These restraints effect the
decisionmaking process and, consequently, the quality of care. See Rodgers, supra, at 467. See
also Comment, Contractual Theories of Recovery in the HMO Provider-Subscriber Relationship:
Prospective Litigation for Breach of Contract, 36 BUFFALO L. REV. 119, 123 (1987) (the
contractual relationship between HMO and subscriber has a spillover effect on the physician
patient relationship). While decisionmaking is shared, the hold harmless provision provides the
treating physician with complete responsibility for these decisions. CMA CONTRACTING HAND-
BOOK, supra, at 3-4.
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B. Prior Authorization and Utilization Review
Authorization requirements and utilization regulations are perhaps the
greatest source of problems created by contracts between health insurers and
physicians.7 6 The purpose of these provisions is to discourage overutilization
so as to maximize the potential profit under a capitation system.7 7 However,
these requirements and regulations may very well contain conditions that are
inconsistent with the accepted standard of care, thus creating a potential
incompatibility with good medical practice. 8
It is essential to keep in mind that the retrospective reimbursement pro-
grams led to the development of a lavish standard of care. 79 Despite the fact
that reimbursement schemes have changed, the standard of care does not
necessarily reflect this change." As a result, a patient who does not recover
against their health insurer may have a colorable claim against the attending
physician because that physician prematurely discharged the patient,' failed
to order exhaustive testing, or did not prescribe the state of the art treat-
ment. 2 If the physician has contracted away his or her ability to practice at
76. As the following example demonstrates, these provisions are intended to contain costs:
The physician agrees that all non-emergency hospital admissions of participants
must be authorized in advance by the Health Insurance Organization. The Health
Insurance Organization shall establish an appropriate length of stay necessary to
treat the condition(s) for which the participant is hospitalized. The initial length of
stay assigned the plan will comply with length of stay criteria and Quality Assurance
Standards adopted by the Utilization Review Committee.
Rodgers, supra note 75, at 674. See also Spivey, The Relation Between Hospital Management
and Medical Staff Under a Prospective-Payment System, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 984, 984
(1984).
77. Furrow, supra note 20, at 190.
Capitation systems such as HMO's put physicians at risk by conscious design. The
capitation principle means that payment is determined in advance for each subscriber
to the HMO, and the HMO will lose money if its costs per patient exceed the
amount they have collected. Physician gatekeepers attempt to discourage overutili-
zation in the HMO; the norms of practice of physicians in HMO's tend toward
lower levels of utilization generally.
Id.
78. Smith, Insurance Carrier Liability as a Result of Pre-Admission Screening and Hospital
Stay Guidelines, 12 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 189, 192 (1985).
79. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
80. Entin, supra note 4, at 679-80.
81. See, e.g., White v. Edison, 361 So. 2d 1292, 1295-97 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (physician
liable for delay in treatment of woman he discharged in spite of her complaints of chills and
fever); Mehigan v. Sheehan, 94 N.H. 274, 276-77, 51 A.2d 632, 633-34 (1947) (physician liable
for physical and mental suffering of patient in labor who he failed to send to hospital).
82. See, e.g., Golanka v. Gatewood, 199 Neb. 216, 225-26, 257 N.W.2d 403, 408-09 (1977)
(physician failed to carefully diagnose tumor before removing it and causing nerve damage);
Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 682 (R.I. 1972) (claim for misdiagnosis requires finding that
diagnosis was wrong and physician was negligent); Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 253, 595
P.2d 919, 924 (1979) (physician liable for failure to test borderline patient for glaucoma).
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the accepted standard of care, it is possible that he or she has breached the
fiduciary duty owed to his or her patients. 3
C. Liability for Peer Review
As part of their contractual obligations, physicians may be required to
participate in peer review.84 The purpose of peer review in this situation is
to contain costs by evaluating the medical necessity of the treatment provided
by the attending physician.'- This is yet another way in which physicians
may be held liable for rendering inadequate care. Peer review can be char-
acterized as an interference with the physician-patient relationship in that a
collective judgment may be substituted for that of the treating physician.
8 6
Concurrently, since the treating physician permits this interference to take
place, it may well constitute a breach of his or her fiduciary duty. 7
There are several issues surrounding the status of peer review. First, there
is some question as to whether physicians who conduct peer review enjoy
statutory immunity.88 Most peer review statutes8 were enacted before pro-
83. Moreover, that physician might also have breached his or her obligation to the state as
a licensed practitioner. See Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391, 394, 282 S.E.2d 903,
905 (1982) ("We find that it is against the public policy of this state to allow one who procures
a license to practice (medicine] to relieve himself by contract of the duty to exercise reasonable
care."). It is also very possible that the physician has become exposed to liability without the
protection of professional liability insurance. CMA CONTRACTING HANDBOOK, supra note 75,
at 5-6. It is inconceivable that malpractice carriers would be bound to insure physicians who
have deliberately contracted away their ability to properly practice medicine. "[Physicians
should give professional liability insurers copies of the proposed contracts. The insurer can
offer useful analysis of the terms of the agreement. This will also inform the physician on the
ways in which the contracts may relate and influence their coverage. Advice from the insurer
can be invaluable in negotiating these contracts." Rodgers, supra note 75, at 468.
84. R. MILLER, supra note 36, at 128-30.
85. Carlucci, supra note 2, at 16.
86. CMA CONTRACTING HANDBOOK, supra note 75, at 7-9. See generally AMERICAN BAR
AssocIATION, PEER REVIEW AND THE LAW (1986) (published by the ABA's Forum Committee
on Health Law).
87. Capron, supra note 13, at 756-58.
88. This is understandable since peer review originally dealt with review of hospital privileges.
See generally Goldberg, The Peer Review Privilege: A Law in Search of a Valid Policy, 10 AM.
J.L. & MED. 151 (1985); Note, The Legal Liability of Medical Peer Review Participants for
Revocation of Hospital Staff Privileges, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 692 (1979); Note, The Missouri
Rule: Peer Review is Discoverable in Medical Malpractice Cases, 50 Mo. L. REV. 459 (1985);
Comment, The Medical Review Committee Privilege: A Jurisdictional Survey, 67 N.C.L. REV.
179 (1988); Comment, Anatomy of the Conflict Between Hospital Medical Staff Peer Review
Confidentiality and Medical Malpractice Plaintiff Recovery: A Case For Legislative Amendment,
24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 661 (1984). However, the federal government's recent enactment of
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101, 11111-11152 (Supp.
IV 1988), is intended "to foster an environment in which health care professionals will be
encouraged to engage in good faith evaluation of their peers by limiting participants' potential
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spective payment and concurrent review came into existence. 9° Second, there
may also be some doubt as to whether physicians' professional liability
insurance would cover peer review activities. Finally, peer review activities
are potentially subject to violations of the antitrust laws. 91 In spite of these
issues, however, many physicians' contracts still require peer review which,
as stated above, could lead to a breach of a physician's fiduciary duty.
D. Unilateral Modification
The terms of some contracts between health insurers and physicians may
provide the third-party payor with the power to unilaterally modify author-
ization policies, utilization limitations, and economic sanctions for noncom-
pliance with the terms of the contract. 92 These provisions create what can
liability." Note, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Will Physicians Find Peer
Review More Inviting? 74 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1115 (1988).
89. ALA. CODE § 22-21-8(b) (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 18.23.030 (1981); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 36-445.01 (Supp. 1975-84); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-9-503 (1979); CAL. EVID. CODE §
1157 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-110(1) (1973 & Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 19a-25 (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1768 (1987); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.40(4) (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1908 (Supp. 1984); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 624-25.5 (Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-1392b (1977 & Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110, para. 8-2101 (Smith-Hurd 1984); IND. CODE ANN. §16-4-3-1 (Burns 1983); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 135.42 (West 1989); 1984 KAN. SESS. LAWS ch. 238, § 7(c); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
311.377(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.3 (West Supp. 1989);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2510(3) (1974); MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-601(d)
(1981 & Supp. 1986); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2632 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
145.64 (West Supp. 1989); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-63-9 (1972 & Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.035.4 (Vernon Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-16-203, 50-16-205 (1987); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 71-2048 (1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.265 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
151:13-a (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.8 (West Supp. 1984-1985); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-9-5 (1982 & Supp.); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10 § 405.24(k) (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 131E-95 (Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-02.1 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.251 (Baldwin 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-709 (West 1984); OR. REV. STAT. §
41.675 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-7 (Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-4-26.1
(1986); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447d, § 3 (Vernon 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§
1958-1960 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 8:01-581.17 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
4.24.250 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-3 (Supp. 1986); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 146.38 (West Supp.
1989); WYo. STAT. § 35-2-602 (1988).
90. CMA CONTRACTING HANDBOOK, supra note 75, at 8.
91. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (surgeon filed suit against physicians who
were partners in a private medical practice alleging they violated sections 1 and 2 of Sherman
Act by initiating peer review proceedings against him to reduce competition). Peer review
activities may violate antitrust laws because peer review involves collaboration by physicians
who are, in all other circumstances, independent. Such collaboration may adversely affect
competition among the physicians. See generally Dolin, Antitrust Law Versus Peer Review, 313
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1156 (1985); Havighurst, Professional Peer Review and the Antitrust Laws,
36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1117 (1986); Miles & Philp, Hospitals Caught in the Antitrust Net:
An Overview, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 489 (1985).
92. A provision which permits unilateral modification may take the following form: "[tlhe
Physician shall adhere to the terms and provisions of the Provider Manual published and
amended periodically by the Health Insurance Organization." Rodgers, supra note 75, at 468.
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be characterized as an "implicit contract" whereby "it is the plan's policy
of determining what it will approve as 'necessary' that triggers full benefits
rather than the stipulations of a contract." 93 In its extreme form, a unilateral
modification clause constitutes egregious overreaching and may be unen-
forceable. However, if such a clause is enforced, then the physician, by
signing the agreement, has essentially permitted potentially unreasonable
third-party interference with his or her relationship with the patient. Once
again, this could represent a breach of the physician's fiduciary duty.
E. Economic Sanctions
Health insurance organizations may insert a threat of economic sanctions
in a physician's contract in order to compel him or her to comply with its
terms. 94 Through this type of provision, a physician may be liable for the
patient's medical expenses if he or she believes that a patient must remain
hospitalized for a period beyond that prescribed by the health insurance
plan. A physician may also face sanctions for unauthorized admissions and
referrals.
Economic sanction provisions are arguably a legitimate attempt to dis-
courage waste and unnecessary utilization. 9 However, economic sanctions
may also have the effect of discouraging the practice of medicine at the
appropriate level of care. Furthermore, a judge or jury in a medical mal-
practice case, hearing evidence of such contractual terms, may seriously
doubt the appropriateness of a physician's conduct where a patient was
discharged prematurely, or was misdiagnosed due to less than exhaustive
testing. 96 Similarly, a physician who accepts a contract containing certain
economic sanction provisions may be viewed as having greater concern for
cost containment than for providing adequate health care. Moreover, the
physician may be found to have breached his or her fiduciary duty by placing
concern for his or her own well-being over that of the patient.
In light of the effect of the provisions discussed above, it is imperative
that physicians carefully examine the contracts they enter into with health
care insurers. A physician's failure to carefully examine such contracts, or
to identify the significance of any of the above contractual terms may result
in the breach of his. or her fiduciary duty to the patient.
93. Pauly, Is Medical Care Different? Old Questions, New Answers, 13 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 227, 235 (1988).
94. For example, contractual provisions relating to prior authorization and utilization
regulations may state: "The physician will be liable for the expenses of any non-emergency
hospitalization not approved in advance by the plan or the expense of any unauthorized period
of hospitalization that extends beyond the length of stay assigned by the plan." Rodgers, supra
note 75, at 467.
95. Schramm, State Hospital Cost Containment: An Analysis of Legislative Initiatives, 19
IND. L. REV. 919, 945 (1986).
96. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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II.. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Several commentators have assumed that physicians are the necessary and
proper decisionmakers to determine both the appropriate distribution of our
society's finite health care resources and the corresponding standard of health
care. 97 This assumption is implicitly founded on two dubious premises. First,
that our society and its medical profession have decided that they will settle
for substandard care. Second, that physicians are both ethically and legally
permitted to provide substandard care even in circumstances where adequate
care is available. Despite this questionable foundation, several commentators
have nonetheless advanced various proposals aimed at altering the existing
law based on these assumptions. A review of these proposals, however, will
demonstrate their inadvisability.
A. Contracting for the Standard of Care
The first proposal is to hold physicians who provide care through an
HMO liable under a standard of care based on contract rather than tort.
With the proliferation of HMO's, it has been said that the medical services
provided in this nation, which at one time were treatment oriented, have
been transformed so as to emphasize the prevention of illness. 98 Essentially,
an HMO has a contractual responsibility to provide or to assure the delivery
of health care services to its subscribers,99 and failure to perform this
obligation constitutes a breach of contract.100 This situation has led some to
* argue that "if these breaches occur in the context of the performance of the
physician-patient relationship, then it may follow that traditional causes of
action, such as malpractice, could sound in contract instead of a negligence
action in tort."'' Indeed, many health care subscribers have agreed, at least
in principle, to accept the type of care expressly or implicitly outlined in the
terms of the health care insurance contract. 102
97. See infra notes 98-138 and accompanying text.
98. Comment, supra note 75, at 119.
In essence then, contrary to the traditional physician-patient relationship where
the patient reactively seeks a doctor for treatment of a malady, in the HMO
physician-patient relationship the patient prospectively contracts for delivery of
medical services. The presence of an insurance component in the contract providing
for all future medical needs, unlimited visits, and peripheral medical services, also





101. Id. The author readily admits that this contention has been raised previously. See
Ficarra, Medical Negligence Based on Bad Faith, Breach of Contract, or Mental Anguish, in
LEGAL MEDICINE 187 (C. Wecht ed. 1980); Stern, supra note 32, at 911. See also Howard,
Medical Malpractice Liability and Cost Containment: Law and Economics in Conflict, 43 FOOD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 309, 332-34 (1988).
102. A. JONSEN, M. SIEGLER & W. WINSLADE, supra note 35, at § 4.4.3.
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On the other hand, proponents of this point of view admit that "the
actual services rendered by physicians to their patients in an HMO are no
different than those in the independent practice." ' 0 3 Furthermore, this po-
sition presumes that the contracts which provide the basis for this cause of
action are the products of arms-length dealings between a health care provider
and a particular subscriber.1°H The ultimate proposal based on these pres-
umptions is the application of a special standard of care to both HMO's
and the physicians that provide health care as a part of the HMO agreements.
As one commentator has explained:
In the typical case of negligent medical malpractice, the standard by which
a physician's conduct is judged is that of '[t]he reasonably prudent phy-
sician or surgeon, acting under the same circumstances.' Analogously, the
contractual standard may be expressed as the performance or delivery of
any terms and conditions for which the parties have contracted.' 5
There are several problems involved in accepting the view that physicians
providing care under an HMO should be held to a contractual standard of
care. First and foremost, this proposal clearly violates the well established
public policy against permitting anyone licensed to practice medicine by the
state to contract away his or her duty to exercise reasonable care.'0 6 Second,
health care delivery made on such terms may very well destroy profession-
103. Comment, supra note 75, at 127.
104. In emphasizing this distinction, one commentator has stated that:
The provider-subscriber relationship is one born out of a written contractual agree-
ment occurring long before the face-to-face confrontation that would normally
initiate the traditional consensual physician-patient relationship. Therefore, it would
appear that the actual basis of the provider-subscriber relationship is one grounded
in contract, suggesting both foundation and remedy in contract .... The subscriber
is not responding to an immediate physical ailment, but to a contractual offer,
indicating that the acceptance is not necessarily creating a relational union but a
contractual one. As noted earlier, the subscriber is acting prospectively, bargaining
for terms and services, not reactively seeking aid for a specific malady.
Id. at 128.
105. Id. at 133 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). This commentator further states:
A special standard of care for HMO's would stress that the HMO is a novel entity
in the delivery of medical care. In attempting to best meet the medical needs of the
public in delivering this care, it is possible that the HMO may be exposed to both
the legal problems of the normal practice standards of independent physicians, and
those novel ones evolving from the HMO's team-like structure. Consequently, the
progress that an HMO may make in preventive medicine may be inhibited by
excessive legal liability. Therefore, it may be necessary that separate standards of
care, duty, risk, and other factors be established for HMO entities.
Id. (citing Bovbjerg, supra note 32, at 1386-87) (footnotes omitted). See also Stern, Will Tort
of Bad Faith Breach of Contract Be Extended to Health Maintenance Organizations? I1 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 12 (1983) (the application of the tort of bad faith breach of contract to
HMO's is necessary to ensure that subscribers have some real bargaining power).
106. Cf. Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391, 394, 282 S.E.2d 903, 905 (1982) ("We
find that it is against the public policy of this state to allow one who procures a license to
practice dentistry to relieve himself by contract of the duty to exercise reasonable care.").
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alism in medicine'07 as well as compromise the crucial role physicians serve
in society. 0 s Physicians hold a position of trust and receive deference from
their patients. Practicing at the accepted professional standard, and with the
best interests of the patient as the primary concern, is a logically separate
concern from a physician's agreement to abide by the terms of a health care
contract and the more limited obligation to provide only those services
required therein. 0 9 Third, and related to the decline of professionalism, the
general quality of health care available to Americans as a whole would in
all probability decline as the result of implementation of this proposal.
There is a significant margin in the varied bargaining power of individuals
who are in need of health care. Permitting physicians to contract away their
duty to exercise the proper standard of care would surely lead to substandard
health care for those without means to obtain better care."10 Additionally,
107. Capron, supra note 13, at 733-34. See also Schuck, supra note 12, at 1422 (rationing
medical care challenges the very foundation of medical professionalism); Stone, Law's Influence
on Medicine and Medical Ethics, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 309, 310 (1985) (an ethical void is
created when "medical practice is viewed through the prism of cost-benefit analysis.").
108. Wright v. District Ct. ex rel. Jefferson, 661 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo. 1983); Newmark v.
Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 596-97, 258 A.2d 697, 702-03 (1969).
109. This general principle has been reflected in the fact that exculpatory clauses have long
been viewed as adverse to public policy and therefore unenforceable. See Tunkl v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 102, 383 P.2d 441, 447, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 39 (1963) (patient
has an inferior bargaining position to hospital, thus exculpatory clause is void); Porubiansky
v. Emory Univ., 156 Ga. App. 602, 605, 275 S.E.2d 163, 165-66 (1980) (dental school's
exculpatory clause void), aff'd, 248 Ga. 391, 392-93, 282 S.E.2d 903, 905 (1982); Olsen v.
Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tenn. 1977) (exculpatory clause to perform abortion void). In
Tunkl, the California Supreme Court stated:
In insisting that the patient accept the provision of the waiver in the contract, the
hospital certainly exercises a decisive advantage in bargaining. The would-be patient
is in no position to reject the proffered agreement, to bargain with the hospital, or
in lieu of agreement to find another hospital. The admission room of a hospital
contains no bargaining table where, as in a private business transaction, the parties
can debate the terms of their contract. As a result, we cannot but conclude that
the instant agreement manifested the characteristics of the so-called adhesion con-
tract. Finally, [the patient] completely placed himself in the control of the hospital;
he subjected himself to the risk of carelessness.
Id. at 102, 383 P.2d at 447, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
110. Capron, supra note 13, at 751.
Even though the feasibility of the private contract approach to reconciling legal
and economic incentives becomes stronger as the fee-for-service system is replaced
by prepaid health packages which could stipulate liability coverage, as part of their
contract, unfortunately no one can doubt that the poor often lack the requisite
freedom of choice necessary to assure the courts that the resultant contract is one
negotiated by two parties with equal bargaining power. In fact, the ability of the
poor to choose their own health care plan or provider is often quite limited.
Howard, supra note 101, at 334. See also Note, Medicare's Prospective Payment System: Can
Quality Survive? 69 IOWA L. REV. 1417, 1429-1431 (1984) ("an HMO seeks to minimize its
medical risks by limiting its enrollee population to relatively healthy individuals"); Comment,
California Negotiated Care: Implications for Malpractice Liability, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 455,
467 (1984) (a fundamental difference exists between malpractice law-which emphasizes quality
of care, and cost-containment standards-which emphasizes reduced quantity of care).
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contracting for a variable standard of care could lead to gross overutilization
and the waste of our health care resources. Those with means would most
likely receive more care than their conditions require and, as the consequence
of limited resources, those without means would receive insufficient health
care to adequately meet their needs."' It has even been suggested that,
because there is always a potential for physician and third-party payor
discrimination against certain types of patients "on the basis of age or other
characteristics, as doctors employ a calculus that aims to conserve social
resources where treatment is likely to be 'wasted'. . . [such a modification
could] reinforce existing biases in medical decisionmaking, particularly neg-





Finally, even those persons able to afford quality health care may not be
capable of contracting for that care because they do not have the medical
expertise which would enable them to know what constitutes quality health
care. "13
B. Economic Constraints Defense
Another proposal suggests "a direct economic defense which would most
plausibly take the form of a rebuttable presumption." '11 4 Under this approach,
it would be presumed that physicians owe all patients the same duty to
provide quality care regardless of the patient's financial resources."' This
proposal, however, would "offer economically pressed physicians some op-
portunity to rebut this presumption where their diminution of care arose by
necessity and not by negligence.""16 Rebuttal of this presumption would
involve demonstrating the nature and severity of the physician's fiscal
constraints" 7 and showing that alternatives to the substandard care were
11. Furrow, supra note 24, at 990. "Capitation programs, packaging of services, and prepaid
arrangements such as HMO's have a built-in disincentive to accept the sickest and the poorest
patients, the very ones who have the hardest time obtaining health care." Capron, supra note
13, at 752.
112. Furrow, supra note 20, at 203.
113. Bovbjerg, supra note 32, at 1392; Morreim, supra note 32, at 1754.
114. Morreim, supra note 32, at 1757. See also Furrow, supra note 24, at 1024 (citing P.
DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 223 (1985)).
115. Morreim, supra note 32, at 1757. Professor Morreim notes that "[sluch a presumption
is important, for it is appropriate that the law urge physicians to seek the highest possible
quality of care, and not to defer too easily to apparent constraints. A major purpose of tort
law is, after all, the deterrence of needlessly injurious conduct." Id.
116. Id.
117. The author of this proposal suggests that the following could be used to demonstrate
the nature and severity of the physician's fiscal constraints:
information about the hospital's overall economic situation, its uncompensated care
burden, the needs of the plaintiff-patient compared with other patients' needs at
the time, the policies developed within the hospital and elsewhere to cope with fiscal
limits, and perhaps even the pressures that have been personally applied to the
physician-defendant.
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"not readily available.""'  The physician would do this by introducing
evidence relating to the specific decisions made in a particular patient's case
or even by offering general guidelines that he or she consistently follows in
all cases when making similar treatment decisions." '9 While admitting that
this is a novel approach, the author of this proposal maintains that it captures
the fundamental tort concepts of fairness and reasonableness 20 in realistically
dealing with the allocation of our finite health care resources.
This approach has a number of drawbacks. The most disturbing short-
coming is that this approach would permit the resurrection of the locality
doctrine.12 1 A physician who is unable to render adequate care due to the
constraints of a particular health care facility, the state of its equipment, or
the level of his or her expertise would be less compelled to make a referral
to a provider that can provide the accepted standard of care.122 It was
precisely this situation which modern medical malpractice case law has tried
to move away from in dispensing with the locality rule. Moreover, th
objectives of tort law actually militate against such a defense in that it fails
to provide victims adequate compensation and quality assurance. 2 1
Furthermore, it is difficult to comprehend a uniform standard for the
determination of when alternatives to substandard care are "not readily
available" that would be acceptable to physicians, hospital administrators,
118. Id. at 1758. Professor Morreim admits that this element is "hazardous." On the one
hand, the physicians cannot be expected to make an exhaustive search for alternative sources
of care. On the other hand, the physician's actions in seeking alternatives must be something
more than a pro forma search. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. As Professor Morreim has explained:
Medical malpractice litigation generally falls within the broad area of tort law that
requires a finding of fault. for the ascription of liability. This requirement, in turn,
is essentially founded upon the moral notion of fairness. On one hand, we believe
it is unfair for an innocent victim to bear the costs of someone else's intentionally
or carelessly harmful conduct. Conversely, we also believe that we should not
ordinarily require someone to pay for unfortunate occurrences when he is not at
fault.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
121. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. Interestingly, Morreim does not seem
concerned with the outmoded qualities of the locality rule which she argues also embody the
themes of reasonableness and fairness. Id. at 1759.
122. See Comment, supra note 110, at 466-67.
123. Id. at 467. At least one commentator has argued that,
[r]eliance on customary medical practices to set the standard of care under mal-
practice law is justified for two reasons. First, medical decisions are typically beyond
the competency of laymen. Judges and juries are usually unable to assess risk
appropriateness. Second, the aggregate of professional medical judgment best sets
the socially appropriate level of risk. The concept of medical professionalism,. which
makes the customary practice standard appropriate, is devoted to the patient's best
interests. Thus, malpractice law emphasizes quality of care. Cost containment
objectives emphasize reduced quantity of care which may result in reducing the
quality of care.
Id. at 467-68.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
third-party payors, and our courts. Such an approach is at odds with the
current state of the law which maintains that anyone who undertakes to
provide health care assumes the absolute duty to provide adequate health
care. 2 4 If such care cannot be provided, then the physician must not under-
take to provide any care whatsoever. "Medical passivity in the face of
corporate and other cost containment pressures is neither desirable nor
necessary."2' In other words, the physician's fiduciary duty requires him or
her to aggressively advocate the patient's interests rather than merely ac-
cepting treatment limitations and undertaking to provide substandard health
care.
C. Shared Tort Liability
Some commentators propose that "the malpractice liability associated with
cost-cutting initiatives should be allocated between hospitals and physicians
so as best to alleviate conflicts, maintain the quality of care, and reduce
costs.'1 26 To achieve this objective, a rebuttable presumption of joint hos-
pital-physician liability could be applied "whenever failure to order tests or
procedures or to hospitalize a patient for an appropriate length of time
results in a breach of professional standards and in a medical injury.' ' 27 A
hospital could rebut this presumption by demonstrating that, despite the
applicability of the protocol or the cost-cutting measure in question, the
patient's injury was actually caused by the physician's negligence. Proponents
of this approach argue that it "would allow a jury to find that a physician's
cost-cutting behavior was reasonable without having to deny compensation
to the victim, . . . [and] enable malpractice law to recognize cost consider-
ations while satisfying the egalitarian and humanitarian values served by a




While this proposal is not without its advantages, 29 the basic flaw involved
in shared physician-hospital liability, and shared physician-payor liability for
124. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
125. Furrow, supra note 24, at 1025.
126. Note, supra note 22, at 1019-20. See also Furrow, supra note 24, at 1031-32 (placing
focus on the institution improves the "detection of errors and medical misadventure").
127. Note, supra note 22, at 1020. "Because this proposal is meant to affect liability only
when cost-cutting is involved, the existence of a utilization protocol or other cost-cutting
initiative applicable to the injured patient would be a prerequisite to invoking the presumption."
Id.
128. Id.
129. Howard has listed a number of advantages, as well as several disadvantages, to this
proposal which have been pointed out by a number of commentators:
First, a hospital's push to reduce services indiscriminately would be tempered by
their expanded liability. Second, if physicians faced a lesser malpractice risk,
incentives to practice defensive medicine would decrease. Third, shared liability
would provide new incentives for physicians and hospitals alike to identify cost
containment guidelines which are both medically and economically sound. On the
other hand, shared physician-hospital liability can generate increased court costs
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that matter, a0 is that it permits physicians to shirk their fiduciary duty to
the patient as the primary decisionmakers on health care matters. A physi-
cian's conduct must be in accordance with the reasonable standard of medical
care. A physician must not permit anything to interfere with his or her
ability to conform to this standard. Joint liability not only permits interfer-
ence with these duties, it also allows the physician to escape total responsi-
bility for injuries which may have been avoided had he or she not allowed
a third-party to interfere with the physician-patient relationship.
D. Modification of the Standard of Care
The Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987131
provides for the exclusion of HMO's and other competitive medical plans
which have "failed substantially to provide medically necessary items and
services" to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries "if the failure has adversely
affected [or has a substantial likelihood of adversely affecting]" such ben-
eficiaries. 3 2 In discussing this provision, the Senate Finance Committee
Report stated "that the practice standards used to determine that items or
services were medically necessary would be based on generally accepted HMO
practice standards."'3 This statement "arguably suggests a recognition and
acceptance of a distinction between the standards of acceptable care in the
fee-for-service setting and in managed health care plans such as HMOs.'
' 4
from litigating the rebuttable presumption issue. Additionally, the apportionment
of liability between physicians and hospitals is a causation issue which can also
increase litigation costs. Lastly, sharing liability with an insolvent hospital may not
be of much assistance for physicians practicing at public facilities whose financial
solvency is precarious.
Howard, supra note 101, at 330-31 (footnotes omitted).
130. Id. at 331-32. While such shared liability has been suggested for private payors,
governmental immunity will generally preclude such a theory in the public sector. See Comment,
Provider Liability Under Public Law 98-21: The Medicare Prospective Payment System in Light
of Wickline v. State, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 1011, 1032-34 (1985) (Wickline v. State, 183 Cal.
App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1986), is an aberration in government immunity law);
Comment, supra note 73, at 1028-1035 (there are various approaches in defining the discre-
tionary/ministerial dichotomy for governmental tort immunity).
131. Pub. L. No. 100-93, 101 Stat. 680 (1987).
132. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1320a-7(b) (c) & (d) (Supp. 1988).
133. S. REP. No. 109, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 682, 690.
134. Basanta, Quality Health Care and Physician Regulation-Recent Developments, 77 ILL.
B.J. 214, 220 (1988). Modification of the standard of care has been discussed elsewhere:
Tort law would operate as a multifaceted mirror, reflecting different standards in
different delivery settings. No cases can be found in the appellate records to analyze
judicial reactions to HMOs, which may suggest that injured plaintiffs are avoiding
suits for other reasons. The theoretical judicial question, however, is the proper
weight to give to customary practice: conclusive weight versus only some evidence?
Given the uncertainty at present as to the quality of care provided in terms of the
balance between patient risk and money saved, courts are likely, if they adopt a
separate HMO standard, to treat it only as some evidence rather than conclusive.
This is probably a desirable perspective until further evidence is available.
Furrow, supra note 24, at 1018.
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An easy solution to the problem arising from this nation's finite health
care resources would involve lowering the standard of care applicable to
physicians practicing in managed health care or cost containment systems.
Without question, however, such a modification of the standard of care
would mean a fundamental change of legal objectives. For example, "[tihe
primary mechanism for incorporating cost considerations into the malpractice
standard would be to redefine the concept of fault: if cost-cutting initiatives
are to be encouraged, some cost-cutting behavior that was previously con-
sidered 'negligent' might now be deemed 'socially desirable.""" Such a
modification would also signal a radical overhaul of our social agenda which
at present includes the objective of quality health care to all members of
our society. As for the future, it seems inconceivable that either the physicians
of this nation'3 6 or our society at large' will readily choose to accept the
delivery of substandard care. Such a radical reform would certainly be
inconsistent with our objective to eventually provide quality health care to
all inhabitants of this nation. Moreover, it would be in direct conflict with
the physician's fiduciary, duty to ensure that his or her patients' receive
adequate and proper care.'
IV. PHYSICIANS AND THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTY To THEIR PATIENTS
Emphasis on the physician's fiduciary duty to his or her patients is the
most appropriate focus for reforms relating to the cost containment goals
now associated with medicine. The fiduciary duty has commonly been applied
to circumstances involving commercial transactions. Consequently, in the
health care setting, it would perhaps at first glance seem appropriate to
confine application of this concept to the third-party payor'3 9 and the ad-
135. Note, supra note 22. at 1017. "Some see [modification of the standard of care) as
appropriate in the evolving health care system to permit different standards of care to develop
for care provided in different practice settings. Others, however, see this development as a
threat to society's basic commitment to provide equally high quality of care for all." Basanta,
supra note 134, at 220. Even those who acknowledge the inevitability of two-class medicine
insist on the maintenance of certain minimal standards of care and the limiting of market access
to only those practitioners who are genuinely qualified. Pauly, supra note 93, at 231.
136. "Physicians are unlikely to press for such a change because their training inculcates an
ethical obligation to do everything possible to help the patient and because peer approval
depends heavily on practicing the 'best medicine."' Note, supra note 22, at 1018 (footnotes
omitted).
137. Courts "have been reluctant to second-guess the profession's standards, and on the rare
occasions that they have done so, it has been to impose a higher standard." Id. See also
Comment, supra note 75, at 21-23 (distinction between "statistical lives" and "identifiable lives").
138. Bovbjerg & Kopit, Coverage and Care for the Medically Indigent. Public and Private
Options, 19 IND. L. REv. 857, 876 (1986).
139. Finkbiner v. Medical Professional Liab. Catastrophe Fund, 546 A.2d 1327, 1329 (Pa.
1988) (cause of action against third-party payor for bad faith refusal to settle based on
contractual and fiduciary relationship).
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ministrators of a given health care facility. 40 However, the courts have also
traditionally applied the fiduciary doctrine to physicians in evaluating their
conduct in the physician-patient relationship.' 4' As the expert and the pro-
fessional in that relationship, doctors must accept the responsibility of
protecting its sanctity. Countless examples in the case law, most recently in
Wickline, demonstrate that regardless of the conduct of the administrators
of the insurance program or the hospital policymakers, a physician's actions
will be independently scrutinized to determine whether he or she did anything,
either by act or omission, to jeopardize the quality of the patient's care.
Physicians are generally not held to a breach of warranty standard unless
there has been a clear expression by the physician to the patient guaranteeing
a specific result. 42 The warranty standard is not usually applied to physicians
because their responsibility is simply to provide the most appropriate care
in light of the patient's condition. 43 However, there may be grounds for
breach of Warranty actions where physicians undertake to provide care under
circumstances in which they themselves have restricted their ability to provide
appropriate care. The warranty, of course, does not have to be expressly
stated in contract.'" The law will instead find that a warranty is an implicit
component of the physician-patient relationship. 45 This warranty, although
140. Lackey v. Bressler, 86 N.C. App. 486, 492-94, 358 S.E.2d 560, 564-65 (1987). (plaintiff
sued medical center and affiliated university under theory of actual and constructive fraud
wherein court recognized that "constructive fraud arises where ... a fiduciary relationship
exists ..."). 0
141. See supra notes 31-52 and accompanying text.
142. PROSSER, supra note 40, § 32, at 186. See Orozco v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia,
638 F. Supp. 280, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (physician's statement that treatment would make the
plaintiff healthy was not an express warranty), aff'd, 813 F.2d 398, 398 (3d Cir. 1987). See
also Taratus v. Smith, 245 Ga. 107, 107-08, 263 S.E.2d 145, 146 (1980) (both parties to a
contract of express warranty must understand and agree to the same thing); Toppino v. Herhahn,
100 N.M. 564, 567-68, 673 P.2d 1297, 1300-01 (1983) (court upholds claim of express warranty
for breast implant surgery); Murray v. University of Pa. Hosp., 340 Pa. Super. 401, 405, 490
A.2d 839, 841 (1985) (recognizing a cause of action for express warranty in tubal litigation
case). But see Sciacca v. Polizzi, 403 So. 2d 728, 732 (La. 1981) (where physician warranted a
devise rather than a result, burden is on physician to refute allegation of express warranty).
143. PROSSER, supra note 40, at 186-87. See Ward v. United States, 838 F.2d 182, 186 (6th
Cir. 1988) (physician is only liable for negligence); Bagherzadeh v. Roeser, 825 F.2d 1000, 1003-
04 (6th Cir. 1987) (jury can be instructed that a physician is not a warrantor of cure or
diagnosis).
144. A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 1-7 (2d ed. 1978); S. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN,
supra note 41, at § 2:3.
145. Capron, supra note 13, at 733-39. The relationship between physician and patient has
been described as a covenant or a contract:
"The structure of the contract has tended to increase not only the physician's
technical authority, but also his 'moral' influence." The physician's authority is
clearly undermined when he fails to honor this contract, either by violating an
explicit ethical rule or by departing from the implicit purpose of the relationship
(as by providing inadequate treatment because of cost constraints or providing
excessive treatment to increase income). Breach of this contract violates the patient's
trust.
Id. at 737 (footnotes omitted) (citing J. FRANK, PERSUASION AND HEALING (rev. ed. 1973)).
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a term from contract law, conveys the basic duty of the physician-fiduciary.
Understanding that the fiduciary duty shall be applied to evaluate a physi-
cian's conduct both during contract negotiations with the third-party payor,
as well as the policymaking process with the administrators of the health
care facility, will provide greater incentive for the preservation of the standard
of care.
Physicians may reasonably protest that they were trained in medicine
rather than finance and business administration, and that they should not
be viewed as fiduciaries in the negotiation of insurance contracts and the
formulation of hospital policy. For the most part, this position is entirely
reasonable. Indeed, bureaucrats and administrators are most qualified to
oversee facility maintenance and fiscal management. The proposal of this
article, however, does not require physicians to have such expertise. More-
over, the fiduciary duty, which applies despite the fact that a physician may
have a contractual relationship with the third-party payor, must be applied
to ensure the preservation of an adequate quality of health care. Physicians
are the sole source for determining whether this standard can be met. 46
Thus, the basic thrust of this article's proposal involves a plea to physicians
to do as their fiduciary duty requires, that is, to force the issue of whether
appropriate care shall be provided under the total health care system. 47
Physicians must assume a role as "codeveloper[s] of the new medical care
provision mechanisms.' ' 48 In the evaluation of whether a physician has
adhered to his or her fiduciary duty, the proper inquiry should be whether
a reasonable physician would agree that the terns of his or her contract
with a health care provider are not inconsistent with providing health care
at the acceptable standard of care.
It is helpful to compare the relationship between the physician and the
third-party payor in the health insurance context with the attorney and the
third-party payor in the liability insurance contract. In many of the latter
circumstances, the insurer has a duty to defend the insured. 49 The attorney
146. Furrow, supra note 24, at 1006-07. PROSSER, supra note 40, at 189. This is axiomatic
considering the fact that only physicians are qualified to testify on the issue of whether
"reasonable care" has been provided in a given instance. F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY,
supra note 40, at 555-59. "The law generally permits the medical profession to establish its
own standards of care." Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 261-62, 239 N.E.2d 368,
372, 292 N.Y.S.2d 440, 446-47 (1968). "There is no one more qualified than the physician to
determine whether the authorization scheme proposed in the agreement is compatible with the
standards of responsible medical practice. The physician must negotiate an adequate system for
review of treatment or refuse to enter into the agreement." Rodgers, supra note 75, at 468.
147. Furrow, supra note 20, at 216.
148. May, On Ethics and Advocacy, 256 J. A.M.A. 1786, 1786 (1986). See also Abrams,
Patient Advocate or Secret Agent? 256 J. A.M.A. 1784, 1785 (1986) (physician should assume
a new role of "physician-businessman" and trust in their own professional integrity).
149. See generally Dondaville, Defense Counsel Beware: The Perils of Conflicts of Interest,
20 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 408 (1982); Note, The Use of Declaratory Judgment to Determine a
Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend-Conflict of Interests, 41 IND. L.J. 87 (1965).
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who is hired to perform that function has a fiduciary duty to faithfully
represent the insured and, in the event that his client's interests conflict with
those of the insurer, he or she must resolve those conflicts in the insured's
favor. 150 Moreover, an attorney's obligation to the client always supercedes
his or her own interests, and nothing can be permitted to interfere with that
fiduciary duty.' 5 ' Similarly, physicians who agree to permit third-party in-
terference with their ability to properly treat their patients, even when that
interference is by the payor of the health care, have breached the fiduciary
duty owed to their patients.
Professor Barry Furrow has persuasively argued that in the age of pro-
spective payment systems, and the utilization review which has accompanied
these systems, physicians play a crucial role as "patient-advocates.'" 5 2 Furrow
correctly interprets Wickline, not to mention the physician's ethical obliga-
tions, as requiring attending physicians to vigorously advocate a patient's
cause through all levels of utilization review so as to ensure adequate care. 53
This interpretation must be applied in evaluating physician conduct in the
negotiation of contracts with the third-party payors'5 4 and in their interaction
with hospital authorities in the creation of policy that relates to the coor-
dination of payment under health insurance programs in relation to actual
utilization costs.'55 The activities of all of these parties affect the type of
care that the patient will ultimately receive: Very simply, physicians have the
affirmative responsibility by virtue of their fiduciary duty to ensure that
neither hospital policy nor health insurance agreements will inhibit their
ability to provide the proper quality of care for all patients.'5 6 Where
physicians are unable to succeed in this charge, they are precluded from
undertaking to provide any care whatsoever.' 517
There are a number of general considerations that should guide physicians
in the negotiation of contracts with third-party payors. First, a physician's
practice income should always be limited to fees and salaries actually earned
150. 7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 4681-4686 (1979 & Supp. 1988).
See also Parsons v. Continental Nat'l Am. Group, 113 Ariz. 223, 550 P.2d 94, 97-98 (1976)
("the attorney who represent an insured owes him an 'undenying and single allegiance' whether
the attorney is compensated by the insurer or the insured." (citing Newcomb v. Meiss, 263
Minn. 35, 116 N.W.2d 593 (1962))).
151. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b), 5.4(c) (1984); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-21 & -22, DR 5-107(B) (1980). See also A. JONSEN, M.
SIEGLER & W. WINSLADE, supra note 35, at § 4.4.4(b).
152. Furrow, supra note 20, at 215-17. Professor Furrow also states, however, that physicians
may satisfy their fiduciary duty through full disclosure to their patients. Furrow, supra note
24, at 1024-32. This is necessarily inconsistent with the physician's fiduciary duty which always
compels negotiation of an agreement that permits care consistent with accepted standards.
153. Furrow, supra note 20, at 215-16, 222-23.
154. See supra notes 72-96 and accompanying text.
155. Furrow, supra note 20, at 221,22. See also Howard, supra note 101, at 330-31; Spivey,
supra note 76, at 985-86; Note, supra note 22, at 1019-22.
156. Relman, supra note 20, at 1150-51.
157. See supra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
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from patient services which were personally provided or supervised.," A
fundamental element of a physician's fiduciary duty requires that he or she
remain always vigilant in assuring that the patient receives quality health
care. The receipt of fees for care which has not been closely monitored, as
required by legal and ethical standards, is the receipt of fees for improperly
provided health care.5 9
Second, physicians must avoid any third-party arrangement that rewards
them for choosing a particular facility or service for their patients or which
rewards them for withholding services from their patients. 16° These sorts of
arrangements, which constitute a clear conflict between the patient's interest
in attaining proper health care and the physician's interest in receiving the
best possible compensation, are obviously prohibited by the fiduciary duty.16
Third, "physicians practicing in investor-owned hospitals, health mainte-
nance organizations, or any other kind of for-profit corporate setting should
be either self-employed or a part of a self-managed and self-regulated medical
group that contracts with the company.' ' 62 Indeed, the new breed of third-
party agreements attempt to control physicians as if they were employees or
agents in the implementation of managed care. These same contracts, how-
ever, label physicians as independent contractors with regard to liability for
the care that is provided. 63 Such an arrangement is clearly unfair and
repugnant to both sound medical' practice and ideals of professionalism.'
64
Finally, "in negotiating a contract physicians should retain the right to
terminate the relationship at any time in the future without cause. The right
to terminate without cause allows a physician to escape a program which
causes unanticipated problems."'' 65 This may be a very difficult condition to
successfully negotiate. 66 Physicians should nevertheless attempt to secure
158. Relman, supra note 20, at 1151.
159. Johnston v. Ward, 288 S.C. 603, 610-11, 344 S.E.2d 166, 170-71 (1986) (treating
physician unable to properly attend patient must make provision for adequate substitution of
competent physician). See also Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 654-55, 368 A.2d 172, 182
(1976) (physician should not leave patient at critical stage without giving reasonable notice or
making suitable arrangements for a substitute physician); Johnson v. Vaughn, 370 S.W.2d 591,
596-97 (Ky. App. 1963) (unwarranted lack of diligence in attending patient renders physician
liable for the consequences).
160. See also Relman, supra note 20, at 1151; Rodgers, supra note 75, at 467-68.
161. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
162. "To protect their professional independence, practitioners should avoid direct individual
employment by a for-profit corporation, because as employees they would be expected to give
primary allegiance to corporate goals rather than patients' needs." Relman, supra note 20, at
1150-51.
163. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
164. Cf. Jones v. City of Chicago, 787 F.2d 200, 206-07 (7th Cir. 1986) (physician's employer
cannot expect physician to practice in manner inconsistent with oath and ethical obligations
regardless of prevailing community medical standard).
165. Rodgers, supra note 75, at 468.
166. Obviously, third-party payors would view this type of provision as a vehicle to play
insurers against each other for the purpose of attaining the highest possible compensation. This
concern may be solved by accepting a good faith condition and a legitimate manner of
documenting contract flaws.
[Vol. 39:131
PHYSICIAN'S FIDUCIAR Y DUTY
this type of provision as a safety valve for dealing with unanticipated
constraints on the physician's ability to provide proper health care.1
6
1
There is no one else who participates in the general structure of our health
care delivery systems who is as qualified as the attending physicians to judge
whether the system's procedures are compatible with accepted standards of
responsible medical practice. Moreover, there is no one else who is legally
and ethically bound as a fiduciary in the same fashion as the attending
physicians. It is, therefore, imperative that physicians negotiate these health
care contracts and hospital utilization procedures aggressively and sensibly
so as to ensure that proper health care is always provided to their patients.
CONCLUSION
It is unfair for society to ask physicians to make the hard decisions relating
to the balancing of our finite health care resources and the quality of care
that all patients shall receive. Moreover, it is unethical and constitutes
malpractice for physicians to accept such a role because it is a breach of
their fiduciary duty to their patients. The physicians' fiduciary duty demands
aggressive negotiation of health care contracts and hospital utilization pro-
cedures by physicians.
Physicians must advocate cost containment systems and procedures that
do not compromise their ability to provide proper health care. The California
Court of Appeals, in Wickline v. State, was correct in concluding that
attending physicians should be held liable when they allow health care
decisions to be made by someone other than themselves. Despite the fact
that our society has made a commitment to providing health care to all
Americans, it has not yet determined that this goal shall be achieved through
the sacrifice of quality care. It is doubtful that our society or our medical
profession will ever accept such a compromise. Therefore, physicians who
permit an erosion of the quality of health care do so at their own peril.
167. This includes both those conditions expressly contained within the four corners of the
contract, see supra notes 71-89, 92-94 and accompanying text, and those which may be
unilaterally added by the third-party payor in the future. See supra notes 90-91 and accom-
panying text.
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